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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-REGULATION OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT-DISCIPLINARY ACTION WAS IMPROPER AGAINST AN
ATTORNEY WHO SOLICITED A CLIENT FOR A NON-PROFIT
ORGANIZATION WHICH UTILIZED LITIGATION AS A VEHICLE FOR
POLITICAL ASSOCIATION AND EXPRESSION.
The Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (Board)
charged petitioner1 with engaging in solicitation in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. 2 The charge related to a letter
sent by petitioner to a prospective client on behalf of the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 3 The Board approved a panel
report recommending that petitioner be found guilty of soliciting a
client on behalf of the ACLU in violation of the disciplinary rules of
the Supreme Court of South Carolina 4 and a private reprimand
1. In re Primus, __ U. S. __ , 98 S. Ct. 1893 (1978). Edna Smith Primus was a lawyer
practicing in Columbia, South Carolina. She was an officer and cooperating lawyer with the
Columbia branch of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Id. at__ , 98 S. Ct. at 1893.
2. Id. at__, 98 S. Ct. at 1897.
3. Id. Prior to sending the letter to Marry Etta Williams, Primus attended a meeting of women
who had been sterilized or threatened with sterilization as a condition of continuing medical
assistance under Medicaid. At the meeting Primus advised the women in attendance of their legal
rights and the possibility ofa lawsuit. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1896. The letter stated:
You will probable (sic) remember me from talking with you at Mr. Allen's office
injuly about the sterilization performed on you. The American Civil Liberties Union
would like to file a lawsuit on your behalf for money against the doctor who performed
the operation. We will be coming to Aiken in the near future and would like to explain
what is involved so you can understand what is going on.
About the lawsuit, if you are interested, let me know, and I will let you know
when we will come down to talk to you about it. We will be coming to talk to Mrs.
Waters at the same time; she has already asked the American Civil Liberties Union to
file a suit on her behalf.
Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1896-97 n. 6.
4. S. C. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103 (D) (5) provides as follows:
A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that recommends,
furnishes, or pays for legal services to promote the use of his services or those of his
partners or associates. However. he may cooperate in a dignified manner with the
legal services activities of any of the following, provided that his independent
professional judgment is excercised in behalf of his client without interference or
control by any organization or other person:
(5) Any other non-profit organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays for
legal services to its members or beneficiaries, but only in those instances and to
the extent that controlling constitutional interpretation at the time of the
rendition of the services requires the allowance of such legal service activities,
and only if the following conditions, unless prohibited by such interpretation.
are met:
(a) The primary purposes of such organization do not include the
rendition of legal services.
(c) Such organization does not derive a financial benefit from the
rendition of legal services by the lawyer.
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was issued. 5 The Supreme Court of South Carolina entered an
order that adopted verbatim the findings and conclusions of the
panel report and increased the sanction to a public reprimand. 6 On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, petitioner asserted the
state had not advanced a subordinating state interest to avoid
unnecessary interference by the disciplinary rules with her first
amendment freedoms. 7 The Court held that South Carolina's
application of the disciplinary rules to the solicitation by letter, on
behalf of the ACLU, violated the first and the fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution.8 In re Primus,
__U.S.-, 98 S. Ct. 1893 (1978).
In Primus, the Court examined the competing values of the
state's power to regulate professions within its borders9 and the first
amendment freedom of association.' ° State regulation of the legal
profession is regarded as within the valid exercise of the state's
power." The need to regulate solicitation developed from the
common law doctrines of barratry, maintenance, and champerty.' 2
State regulation of the legal profession has not been without
S. C. CODE OF PROFFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104 (A) provides as follows:
A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel
or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice, except
that:
(5) If success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in the
nature of a class action is dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may
accept, but shall not seek, employment from those contacted for the purpose of
obtaining theirjoinder.
5. __ U. S. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1898-99.
6. In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 233 S.E.2d 301 (1977).
7.. U.S. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1899.
8. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1909. The Court only considered the constitutionality of DR 2-103
(D) (5), because the lower court determined that DR 2-103 (D) (5) proscribed in a narrower fashion
the same conduct as DR 2-104 (A) (5). A determination that DR 2-103 (D) (5) was unconstitutional
would mean DR 2-104 (A) (5) was unconstitutional. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1902 n.18.
9. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U. S. 773 (1975); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608 (1935).
10. - U. S. at __ , 98 S. Ct. at 1899. "[T]here is no longer any doubt that the [f]irst and
[f]ourteenth [a]mendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity."NAACP v. Button, 371
U. S. 415, 430 (1963). See, e. g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937).
11. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U. S. 773 (1975); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971);
Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U. S. 379 (1963); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U. S. 820
(1961); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117 (1961).
12. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963). "Barratry is the offense of frequently exciting
and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise.- Churchwell v. State, 195 Ga. 22,
__, 22 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1942). "Maintenance is defined as 'an officious intermeddling in a suit
which in no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise to
prosecute or defend.' " Schnabel v. Taft Broadcasting Co., Inc., 525 S. W. 2d 819, 823 (Ct. App.
Mo. 1975). "Champerty, a species of maintenance, consists of an agreement under which a person
who has no interest in the suit of another undertakes to maintain or support it at his own expense in
exchange for part of the litigated matter in the event of a successful conclusion of the cause." Id.
The policy of these common law doctrines was to prevent disinterested third parties from
using law suits to oppress poor people or to vex political opponents. Se generaly Zimroth, Group Legal
Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L. J. 966, 969-71 (1967).
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constitutional limitations. The United States Supreme Court has
held that the state's power to regulate the legal profession is subject
to procedural due process guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment1 3 and has incorporated in the due process clause the
freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment. 1
4
In situations where a conflict exists between state regulations
and first amendment freedoms of association, the state must show a
subordinating interest which is compelling and the means
employed to achieve that interest must be closely drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.15 The leading
case concerned with these competing interests of solicitation and
freedom of association was NAACP v. Button. 16 In Button, the Court
took a three-step approach to determine whether the activities of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) were protected by the first amendment. 
17
First, the Button Court looked at whether solicitation of a client
was outside the protected freedoms of the first amendment. 18 The
Court stated that within the framework of the NAACP objectives,
"litigation is not a technique of resolving private differences; it is a
means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment
by all government, federal, state, and local, for the members of the
Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political
expression. "19
13. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsbergv. State Bar, 353 U.
S. 252 (1957).
14. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960) (freedom of association); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) (freedom of religion); Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937)
(freedom of assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931) (freedom of press); Fiske v. Kansas,
274 U. S. 380 (1927) (freedom of speech).
15. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963). "Even a 'significant interference' with protected
rights of political association may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important
interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational
freedoms." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976).
16. 371 U. S. 415 (1963).
17. Id. at 429-44. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),
through the Virginia Conference of the NAACP (Conference) maintained a legal staff of fifteen
attorneys, all of whom were.Negroes and members of the NAACP. Each legal staff member agreed to
abide by the policies of the NAACP, which limited the kinds of lawsuits handled to those with a
question of possible racial discrimination. Once the legal staff decided a litigant, whether a member
or non-member of the NAACP, was entitled to NAACP assistance, the Conference defrayed all
litigation expenses in the case and usually, although not always, paid each assisting lawyer a per
diem fee of not more than sixty dollars. None of the staff received a salary from the NAACP, nor
could he accept any compensation from the litigant or any other source for the work in the NAACP
assisted case.
NAACP legal staff members became involved in public school desegregation cases through
their attendance at meetings of parents and children, often prompted by bulletins from the
Conference urging desegregation and encouraging the bringing of lawsuits, at which meetings the
staff members would speak on the steps necessary to achieve desegregation. Blank authorization
forms brought by the staff member, authorizing NAACP attorneys to represent the signers in legal
proceedings to desegregate schools. were made available to those in attendance. By the act of
signing, the plaintiffs in the particular actions made their own decisions to enter the litigation. Id. at
420-22.
18. Id. at 429-31.
19. Id. at 429. The basic objectives and purposes of the NAACP are to eliminate racial barriers
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Second, the Court considered the impact the enforcement of
the solicitation statute would have upon first amendment
freedoms.2 0 In the area of free expression, standards of permissible
statutory vagueness are strict and the government may regulate in
the area only with narrow specificity. 21 The Button Court concluded
that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' construction of the
solicitation statute, as applied to the NAACP activities, violated the
first and fourteenth amendments by unduly inhibiting protected
freedoms of expression and association.
22
Third, the Button Court considered whether the record showed
that there was a subordinating interest in the regulation of the legal
profession that would justify limiting the first amendment rights of
the NAACP. 23 Virginia attempted to equate the common law
crimes of barratry, maintenance, and champerty with the activities
of the NAACP, but malicious intent was required for the common
law crimes and it was not present in the record.2 4 Additionally, the
record failed to show a pecuniary gain for the NAACP, a conflict of
interest between the clients and the NAACP, or a private gain
through the use of the legal process. 25 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that "the state. . . . failed to advance any substantial
regulatory interest, in. the form of substantial evils flowing from the
petitioner's activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions
which it has imposed. "26 Therefore, the United States Supreme
Court found that, based on the record, the NAACP activities were
modes of expression and association which Virginia may not
prohibit as improper solicitation.
27
Three subsequent opinions of the United States Supreme
Court have extended Button to prevent states from proscribing
solicitation of legal counsel by labor unions for their members. 28 In
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 29
which deprive Negroes of equal rights within the United States. The NAACP devotes funds to
litigation on behalf of these purposes. Id. at 419-20.
20. Id. at 431-38.
21. Id. at 432-33. A statute may be invalid if it restricts guaranteed first amendment freedoms,
even though the record shows the petitioner has not engaged in the privileged conduct. The threat of
the statute's sanction deters protected first amendment freedoms as much as the actual sanction. Id.
See, e. g., Note, The FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
22. 371 U. S. at 437.
23. Id. at 438-42.
24. Id. at 438-40.
25. Id. at 441-43.
26. Id. at 444.
27. Id. at 428-29. The dissent argued that the evidence in the record did show that the evils
sought to be prevented by the state were present. Id. at 452 (Harlan, Clark, Stewart,J., dissenting).
28. United Transp. Uhion v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U. S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers
of America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U. S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R. R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U. S. 1 (1964).
29. 377 U. S. 1(1964).
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the majority stated that the rights of free speech, petition and
assembly guaranteed by the first amendment gave railroad workers
the right to consult with each other and select a spokesman who
could be counted on to provide counseling. 30 In UnitedMine Workers
of America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association, 31 the Court said
that the rights of free speech, petition and assembly gave the United
Mine Workers Union the right to maintain an attorney on a
salaried basis to assist the members of the Union in asserting their
legal rights.32 The Court found no legal significance in the fact
that the United Mine Workers Union attorney was actually a
salaried employee of the Union, while under the plan approved in
the prior case against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the
attorney was a beneficiary of the Union's referral
recommendations. 33 In United Transportation Union v. State Bar of
Michigan, 34 the Court concluded that the common thread which ran
through the prior decisions was that collective activity to obtain
access to the courts was within the scope of protection of the first
amendment. 
35
In Primus, the presence or absence of this common thread was
the first question the United States Supreme Court was required to
address in determining whether petitioner's conduct was protected
by the first amendment. 36 The Supreme Court rejected the
conclusion of the lower court and stated that the record did not
support any distinction between the ACLU and the NAACP.
37
30. Id. at 5-6. Under the Brotherhood plan, the United States was divided into sixteen regions
and the Brotherhood selected a lawyer in each region with a reputation for honesty and skill in
representing members in railroad personal injury suits. Whenever a member was injured or killed,
the secretary of the local lodge would reccommend that the lawyer from that region be consulted. Id.
at 4. The dissent distinguished this case from Button on the ground that Button involved "political
expression" whereas this case involved a procedure for settlement of damage claims. Id. at 10 (Clark,
HarlanJ., dissenting).
31. 389 U. S. 217 (1967). Under the United Mine Workers' plan, the Union retained one
attorney on a salaried basis. Injured Union members were advised to fill out a form entitled "Report
to Attorney on Accidents" and to turn the -form into the Union's legal department. When the
attorney receives a report, he presumes the worker wants to file an application for a claim
adjustment. The claim is prepared by the attorney, usually without discussing the claim with the
worker, and is presented to opposing counsel for negotiations and an attempt to reach a settlement. If
no settlement is reached, the Industrial Commission schedules a hearing. This is usually the first
time the attorney and client come into personal contact with each other. Id. at 219-21.
32. Id. at 221-22.
33. Id. The dissent argued that the Union's plan would unfortunately permit mass processing of
client's claims and is not conducive to a good attorney-client relationship. Id. at 231-32 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
34. 401 U. S. 576 (1971). The Union advised members having claims under the Federal
Emploxees Liability Act to consult designated attorneys. Prior to March. 1959. the Union had
intormed injured members that the designated attorneys would not charge in excess of 25% of any
recovery. Union representatives were reimbursed for transporting the prospective clients to the legal
counsel offices. Id. at 578.
35. Id. at 585.
36. - U. S. at-, 98 S. Ct. at 1902 (1978).
37. Id. at - , 98 S. Ct. at 1902-05. The South Carolina Supreme Court stated that the
primary purpose of the ACLU was to render legal services, a fact which in its view differentiated that
organization from the NAACP in that the legal services offered by the latter were only secondary to,
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Both the ACLU and the NAACP use litigation as a form of
political expression and association to advance their purposes.
38
The Court did not consider that the ACLU request for counsel fees
took the case outside of Button, because the NAACP often makes
similar requests.3 9 The Court concluded that Primus did fit within
the level of protection of Button requiring South Carolina to present
a compelling state interest in the regulation of this type of
solicitation and a means of regulation drawn with narrow
specificity.
40
The disciplinary rules at issue covered some concededly
constitutionally protected activity. 41 Notwithstanding the broad
sanctions imposed by South Carolina, the Court would have
allowed petitioner to be disciplined if the evidence of her activities
had involved the kind of conduct which South Carolina was trying
to prevent.4 2 The Court did not find any of the substantive evils
present on the record. 43 In addition, a state may regulate in
broad prophylatic manner, speech that simply proposes a
commercial transaction;44  however, in the area of political
or a vehicle for lie furtherance of. its political aims. In re Smith. 268 S. C. 259. _ . 233 S. F. 2d
301, 305-06 (1977).
38. - U. S. at __ , 98 S. Ct. at 1902-03.
39. Id. at-, 98S. Ct. at 1903.
40. Id. at__, 98 S. Ct. at 1905.
41. Id. Even though the state conceded that the conduct of Ms. Primus in the informal meeting,
see supra note 2, was constitutionally protected, it is not clear that such a meeting is protected by the
literal terms of the rule. "Moreover, the disciplinary rules in question permit punishment for mere
solicitation unaccompanied by proof of any of the substantive evils that appellee maintains were
present in this case." __ U. S. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1905.
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, _ U. S. _ . 98 S. Ct. 1912 (1978). a companion
case to Primus, the Court concluded that the state bar could constitutionally discipline a lawyer for in-
person solicitation for pecuniary gain. I n Ohralik, the state regulated in a broad prophylactic manner,
and applied its broad regulations in a disciplinary proceeding against the attorney without proof that
any of the substantive evils were present in the case, because commercial speech and not the first
amendiment freedoms of association and expression was the constitutionally protected event under
consideration. Id. at __ 98 S. Ct. at 1920.
42. Id. at __,98 S. Ct. at 1906. The state claimed that the regulatory program was aimed at
the prevention of undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, conflict of
interest, lay interference and other evils generally attributed to lawyer solicitation of prospective
clients. Id. at __,98 S. Ct. at 1905.
43. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1906. The Court examined the evidence and found that solicitation
bv letter. as contrasted with in-person solicitation. did not in\ olve an invasion of privacy or an
opportunity for overreaching. The letter pros ided additional infitrnation for thc prospective client to
make an informed decision. The record was void of any likelihood of conflict of interest or lay
interference with the attorney-client relationship. As in Button there was no showing that the litigant
was solicited for a malicious purpose, or for a private gain seeking no public interest. Consequently
the common law offenses of barratry, maintenance and champerty would not be present. Id. at __,
98 S. Ct. at 1906-07. See supra note 24 and text referenced thereto.
44. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1906. When solicitation involves a commercial transaction the test
used is prophylactic regulation in furtherance of the state's interest in protecting the public. When
political expression or association is at issue a member of the Bar may not be disciplined unless the
evidence shows the conduct was of the type against which the broad prohibition was directed. Id. See
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, __ U. S. __, 98 S. Ct. 1912 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council. Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976). See Also Friedman v. Rogers.- U. S. __ , 99 S. Ct. 887
(1979).
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expression and association the state must regulate with significantly
greater precision.
4 5
The dissent in Primus46 disagreed with the differing levels of
scrutiny used in Primus and the companion case, Ohralik. In the
dissent's view, the state would not have to show that the harmful
consequences were actually present; instead, the state would have
permitted to review the objective conduct of an attorney, and
discipline would be constitutional whenever the state's belief that
such conduct could result in the substantive evils the state per-
missibly sought to prevent was a reasonable one.
47
The North Dakota disciplinary rule corresponding to the rule
construed in Primus has not been interpreted in any North Dakota
court decisions.48 However, following the guidelines set forth by
Primus and Ohralik, the pivotal point in any North Dakota case will
be whether, in the individual case, the solicitation can be termed
"association" through a non-profit organization or "commercial
speech" for private gain. 49
Due to the differing levels of scrutiny, there will be a dispute as
45. - U. S. at ., 98 S. Ct. at 1908. "Accordingly, nothing in this opinion should be read
to foreclose carefully tailored regulation that does not abridge unnecessarily the associational
freedom of non profit organizations, or their members, having characteristics like those of the
NAACP or the ACLU." Id. at __ 98 S. Ct. at 1908-09.
46. - U. S. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1909 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority stated that
the motive of the attorney would be relevant. Consequently, the court would inquire whether the
attorney was trying to advance an idea through association and expression or seeking a pecuniary
gain. The dissent argued that the more objective standard of the attorney's conduct should be used,
because the attorney's motive is too speculative. Id. at __ , 98 S. Ct. at 1910-12 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
47. Id. at __, 98 S. Ct. at 1911-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48. N. D. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103 (D) (4) provides as follows:
A lawyer shall hot knowingly assist a person or organization that furnishes or pays for
legal services to others to promote the use of his services or those of his partner or
associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm except as permitted in DR
2-101 (B). However, this does not prohibit a lawyer or his partner or associate or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm from being recommended, employed or
paid by, or cooperating with one of the following offices or organizations that promote
the use of his services or those of his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated
with him or his firm if there is no interference with the exercise of independent
professional judgement in behalf of his client:
(4) Any bona fide organization that reccommends, furnishes or pays for legal
services to its members or beneficiaries provided that the following conditions
are satisfied:
(a) Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized and
operated that no profit is derived by it from the rendition of legal
services by lawyers, and that, if the organization is organized for profit,
th, legal services are not rendered bv lawyers emploved. directed.
supervised, or selected by it except in connection with matters where
such organization bears ultimate liability of its member or beneficiary.
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his partner, nor associate, nor any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, nor any non-lawyers shall have
initiated or promoted such organization for the primary purpose of
providing financial or other benefit to such lawyer, partner. associate or
affiliated lawyer.
49. U. S. at _ . 98 S. Ct. at 1910. A determination of the category into which the
solicitation fits will tri,,tg era diflirnt l'v l of'scrut 'i . Id.
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to whether the solicitation is commercial speech or political
association. The effect of the Primus decision may lead the classic
"ambulance chaser" to try to conform his conduct to some
associational goal that would require the potential disciplinary
proceeding against him based on that solicitation to be judged
under the more rigorous standards of scrutiny applied by the
Supreme Court to South Carolina's discipline of Edna Smith
Primus.50
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50. Id. at - . 98 S. Ct. at 1910 (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting). Justice Rehnquist elaborated
upon this in his dissent, where he stated, -[TJhe next lawyer tn Uhralik's shoes who is disciplined for
similar conduct will come here cloaked in the prescribed mantel of 'political association' to assure
that insurance companies do not take unfair advantage of policy holders." Id.
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